Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

Fall 9-6-2019

Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (June 6, 2019)
Jordan Gregory Cloward

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs

Recommended Citation
Cloward, Jordan Gregory, "Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (June 6, 2019)" (2019). Nevada Supreme
Court Summaries. 1236.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1236

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (June 6, 2019)1
CRIMINAL LAW: COMPETENCY, AUDIOVISUAL TESTIMONY, EVIDENCE
Summary
The Court reviewed an appeal from a defendant who was convicted of seven sexually
related counts. The defendant challenged his conviction on three grounds: (1) that the district court
erred in permitting the victim to testify via two-way audiovisual transmission; (2) that the district
court abused its discretion in proceeding to trial after the State raised concerns about the
defendant’s competency; and (3) that the district court erred in convicting the defendant of both
sexual assault and attempted sexual assault where both counts were based on the same incident.
The Court concluded that the district court properly permitted testimony via audiovisual
transmission and adopted the Craig test to determine when audiovisual testimony is proper. The
court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the trial to
proceed despite questions regarding the defendant’s competency, but that the district court erred
in convicting the defendant of both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault.
Facts and Procedural History
The defendant was charged with seven sexually related counts including both sexual
assault and attempted sexual assault. The victim alleged that the defendant trespassed into a
residential treatment facility where the victim was seeking treatment for trauma related to her
previous experiences as a sex trafficking victim. At around 5 a.m., the victim awoke to find the
defendant standing at the end of the couch, in the recreation room, upon which she had been
sleeping. The defendant allegedly exposed himself to the victim and forced her to have sex with
him. The defendant then attempted to force the victim to perform fellatio on him, but she was able
to resist. Angry at her resistance, the defendant walked away. Another patient and facility staff
members saw the defendant exiting the treatment center. Police officers found the defendant near
the center.
After being indicted, the defendant invoked his right to a speedy trial. The defendant
subsequently opposed a motion, brought by the State, to allow the victim to testify via two-way
audiovisual transmission. The district court granted the State’s motion, because the victim was a
patient at an out-of-state treatment center and because the defendant had refused to allow a
continuance of the trial until the victim was released from the treatment facility. Thus, the d istrict
court ruled, the only way for the victim to testify on the preset trial dates was by deposition or by
audiovisual transmission.
During a pretrial hearing, the State raised concerns regarding the defendant’s competency.
The defendant’s counsel refuted any competency concerns and, after the court engaged in a
“lengthy canvas” of the defendant, the court found no basis to doubt his competency. The next
day, the court again canvassed the defendant and again found him competent to proceed to trial.
The district court again questioned the defendant’s competency when, on the first day of trial, the
defendant refused to change into a suit despite concerns that appearing before the jury in jail
clothes might prejudice the jury against him. After conferring with the defendant’s counsel, the
district court once again found the defendant to be competent for trial.
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During trial, the defendant repeatedly rebuked the court for permitting the victim to testify
via audiovisual transmission. The defendant was angered , it appeared, by a misunderstanding over
how the audiovisual technology worked – the defendant thought that the victim’s testimony had
been prerecorded and was being presented to the court via YouTube. Eventually, the defendant
waived his right to appear at trial and the district court ordered his removal from the courtroom.
The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts except for one count of sexual assault .
The district court sentenced the defendant to 20 years to life in prison.
Discussion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial after the State expressed
concerns about the defendant’s competency
The Court reviewed the district court’s refusal to order a competency evaluation under an
abuse of discretion standard of review.2 While whether there is a doubt as to a defendant’s
competency is within the discretion of the trial court, where there is “substantial evidence that the
defendant may not be competent to stand trial,” the trial court must hold a competency hearing. 3
The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial
because there was substantial evidence that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial
court relied on assurances from the defendant’s counsel, its own interactions with the defendant,
and the defendant’s responses to the court’s canvass in concluding that the defendant was
competent for trial. While the defendant’s behavior was “obstinate,” the record did not provide
enough evidence to support a conclusion of discretion of abuse by the trial court.
Allowing the victim to testify via simultaneous audiovisual transmission, pursuant to the procedure
set forth in Nevada Supreme Court Rules Part IX-A(B), did not violate the defendant’s rights under
the Confrontation Clause
The Court reviewed de novo whether the trial court violated the defendant’s rights under
the Confrontation Clause in permitting the victim to testify via two-way audiovisual transmission. 4
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides criminal defendants the right to crossexamine witnesses who testify against them. 5 However, face-to-face confrontation at trial may be
denied where “denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and
only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”6
The Court took the opportunity to adopt the Supreme Court’s test presented in Craig v.
Maryland, to determine whether permitting a witness to testify via audiovisual transmission
violates a defendant’s right to confrontation.7 The Court concluded that the district court properly
See Olivares v. State, 124 Nev. 1142, 1148 (2008) (“A district court abuses its discretion and denies a defendant
his right to due process when there is reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's competency and the district court
fails to order a competency evaluation”).
3 Melchor-Gloria v. State, 99 Nev. 174, 180 (1983); Olivares, 124 Nev. at 1148.
4 See Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 339 (2009) (“whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated
is ‘ultimately a question of law that must be reviewed de novo’” (citations omitted)).
5 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
6 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
7 Under the Craig test, two-way video testimony is permitted if (1) it “is necessary to further an important public
policy,” and (2) “the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.” Id.
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permitted the victim to testify via two-way transmission because the decision (1) promoted
“important public policy” by protected the victim’s well-being and ensuring the defendant’s right
to a speedy trial, and (2) the transmission permitted the jury to hear and observe the victim and
permitted the defendant to cross-examine the victim.
The defendant’s conviction for both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault based on the same
conduct was in error, and there was insufficient evidence to uphold the sexual assault charge
The defendant argued, and the state conceded, that the convictions of both sexual assault
and attempted sexual assault based upon a single act – namely, the defendant touching his penis to
the victim’s closed mouth – could not stand simultaneously. The defendant argued that the Court
should vacate the sexual assault conviction because there was no penetration, while the State
argued that the conviction of sexual assault was valid, based upon the definition of fellatio
presented in the jury instructions.8 The Court agreed that both convictions could not stand, and
reviewed the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of
the greater of the two charges – sexual assault.
The Court conducted its analysis under a sufficiency of evidence standard of review. 9 As
relevant to the case, NRS 200.364(9) defines sexual penetration as “fellatio, or any intrusion,
however slight, of any part of a person’s body.” 10 To prove attempted sexual assault, the
prosecution must establish “that (1) [the defendant] intended to commit sexual assault; (2) [the
defendant] performed some act toward the commission of the crime; and (3) [the defendant] failed
to consummate its commission.”11 Thus to affirm the defendant’s conviction, there must have been
sufficient evidence that he consummated the act of fellatio.
While fellatio does not require penetration, it does require “obtaining sexual satisfaction
by oral stimulation of the penis.”12 Here, because the victim had testified that the defendant had
pressed his penis against her closed lips “just once,” the Court held that there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction of sexual assault. Rather, the defendant had attempted a sexual
assault and had failed.13 As such, the Court vacated the sexual assault conviction and remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to amend its judgment consistent with the Court’s
opinion.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the district court did not err in its decision to allow the victim to
testify via two-way audiovisual transmission and that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing the defendant to proceed to trial despite concerns regarding his competency. The Court
The jury instruction regarding the definition of fellatio was, “[o]ral stimulation of the penis for sexual
satisfaction.”
9 “[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979); see also Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381 (1998),
10 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.364(9).
11 Van Bell v. State, 105 Nev. 352, 354 (1989) (citing NRS 193.330).
12 Maes v. Sherrif, 94 Nev. 715, 716 (1978) (citation omitted) (concluding that the State met its burden of proving
sexual assault where the defendant licked the victim’s penis because there was oral stimulation, even in absence of
penetration).
13 See Crawford v. State, 107 Nev. 345, 351 (1991).
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further concluded that the district court erred in convicting the defendant of both sexual assault
and attempted sexual assault based upon the same conduct, and that there was insufficient evidence
for a conviction of sexual assault.

